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Legal Malpractice: Is it Tort or Contract?
The Honorable Blanche M. Manning1
I. INTRODUCTION
A large number of client complaints against attorneys are based
upon the alleged neglect of client affairs.2 A legal malpractice ac-
tion may take the form of a contract action predicated upon an
attorney's failure to perform pursuant to a contract of employ-
ment.3 Legal malpractice actions in Illinois, however, have devel-
oped as actions in tort.4 In these actions, plaintiffs generally seek
recovery for economic loss damages resulting from the attorney's
breach of duty to his client.5
In order to prevail on a tort-based claim of attorney malpractice,
a plaintiff must prove that the attorney-client relationship created a
duty on the part of the attorney and that the attorney breached
that duty.6 An attorney's duty of care arises upon formation of the
attorney-client relationship.7 An attorney breaches his duty of
care if he fails to exercise the care and skill expected of a member
of the legal profession when handling his client's case. 8
The plaintiff in a legal malpractice action must also establish
1. Justice, Illinois Appellate Court, First District, J.D. 1967, The John Marshall Law
School. I wish to acknowledge the invaluable assistance of Drella C. Savage, my judicial
law clerk, and Patricia Sowinski, a student of Loyola University School of Law, for their
research and assistance throughout this article.
2. See R. MALLEN & J. SMiTH, 1 LEGAL MALPRACTICE (1989). The authors explain
that the most common client complaint is that the attorney failed to give the matter
sufficient attention. Id. at 183. One-fourth of legal actions against attorneys are the re-
sult of negligence in handling the attorney-client relationship. Id. at 7.
3. Keeton, Professional Malpractice, 17 WASHBURN L.J. 445, 448 (1978). See also
Annotation, What Statute Governs Actions Against Attorneys for Negligence in Perform-
ance of Professional Services, 49 A.L.R.2d 1216, 1219-21 (1956).
4. See, e.g., Pelham v. Griesheimer, 92 Ill. 2d 13, 18, 440 N.E.2d 96,98 (1982); Bar-
tholomew v. Crockett, 131 Ill. App. 3d 456, 475 N.E.2d 1035 (1st Dist. 1985). See also
Sexton v. Smith, 112 Ill. 2d 187, 492 N.E.2d 1284 (1986).
5. See, e.g., Christison v. Jones, 83 Ill. App. 3d 334, 405 N.E.2d 8 (3d Dist. 1980).
6. Sexton, 112 Ill. 2d at 193, 492 N.E.2d at 1286-87; Pelham, 92 Ill. 2d at 18, 440
N.E.2d at 98; Bartholomew, 131 Ill. App. 3d at 465, 475 N.E.2d at 1041.
7. Schmidt v. Hinshaw, Culbertson, Moelmann, Hoban & Fuller, 75 Ill. App. 3d 516,
521-22, 394 N.E.2d 559, 563 (1st Dist. 1979).
8. This standard generally is established through expert testimony. Schnidt v.
Henehan, 140 Ill. App. 3d 798, 801, 489 N.E.2d 415, 417 (2d Dist. 1986). The law
recognizes a distinction between negligence and errors in judgment. Brainerd v. Kates,
68 Ill. App. 3d 781, 386 N.E.2d 586 (1st Dist. 1979).
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that "but for" the attorney's negligence, the client would not have
suffered any damages. 9 For example, damages for legal malprac-
tice in the course of litigation arise only if the client would have
prosecuted or defended the underlying lawsuit successfully but for
the attorney's neglect of his client's affairs. 10 Because attorney
malpractice rarely results in personal injury or property damage,
the damages plaintiffs seek most often in malpractice claims
against attorneys are for economic or pecuniary losses allegedly
caused by the attorney's failure to exercise adequate care.1
Traditionally, the concepts of standard of care and negligence,
which are central to most attorney malpractice actions in Illinois,
have been associated solely with actions in tort. In contrast, the
economic loss damages malpractice plaintiffs customarily seek are
most often associated with actions for breach of contract. With
this crossover between concepts and disciplines, it was inevitable
that serious questions would arise as to the recoverability of eco-
nomic loss damages in tort-based attorney malpractice claims.
Those problems were ushered in by the Illinois Supreme Court's
decision in Moorman Manufacturing Co. v. National Tank Co.'2
In Moorman, the court adopted what has been termed the "eco-
nomic loss doctrine," the rule that purely economic losses cannot
be recovered in many tort actions.' 3 The Illinois Supreme Court
has stated in dicta that Moorman would not prohibit recovery in
tort actions for legal malpractice.' 4 However, the Illinois courts
have not yet reached a consensus on this precise issue. Because of
this uncertainty, Moorman may yet lead the courts to question
9. Zych v. Jones, 84 Ill. App. 3d 647, 406 N.E.2d 70 (1st Dist. 1980). See also Trust-
ees of Schools v. Schroeder, 2 Ill. App. 3d 1009, 1012-13, 278 N.E.2d 431, 433 (1st Dist.
1971). Other states have also taken the view that in a legal malpractice action, the plain-
tiff "must allege and prove that the actionable wrong proximately caused the damage for
which recompense is sought." Mylar v. Wilkinson 435 So. 2d 1237, 1239 (Ala. 1983); see
also Strobel v. Peterson, 149 Ariz. 213, 717 P.2d 892 (1986).
10. Claire Assocs. v. Pontikes, 151 Ill. App. 3d 116, 122, 502 N.E.2d 1186, 1190 (1st
Dist. 1986).
11. See Harrison v. Dean Witter Reynolds Inc., 715 F. Supp. 1425, 1433-34 (N.D. Ill.
1989) (allowing recovery of economic losses in negligence claim against brokerage firm
because the firm had an extra-contractual duty to prevent economic losses). As one Illi-
nois court noted, the injury resulting from attorney malpractice is not easily categorized.
Christison, 83 Ill. App. 3d at 338, 405 N.E.2d at 11. Such injury "has aspects of the tort
to property, inasmuch as the injuries resulting are to property interests, and it has highly
personal aspects without being a personal injury tort." Id.
12. 91 111. 2d 69, 435 N.E.2d 443 (1982).
13. Id. at 87-89, 435 N.E.2d at 451-52 (economic loss damages are not recoverable in
tort actions based on negligence, strict liability, or innocent misrepresentation).
14. 2314 Lincoln Park West Condominium Assoc. v. Mann, 136 Ill. 2d 302, 317-18,
555 N.E.2d 346, 353 (1990).
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whether a plaintff may recover for economic losses in contract-
based legal malpractice actions in Illinois."5 Indeed, it has been
suggested that Moorman may have opened the way for a new era of
professional liability actions in Illinois.16
This Article examines the Moorman decision and its applicabil-
ity to legal malpractice actions. First, this Article briefly discusses
the rationale behind the Moorman decision. 7 Second, the Article
analyzes the parameters of Moorman outside the context of prod-
ucts liability, focusing upon the conflicting appellate decisions in
the professional negligence area.'" Next follows a discussion of
Moorman and legal malpractice.' 9 This Article concludes with a
review of policy considerations underlying the application of Moor-
man to legal malpractice and a discussion of the possiblity that the
economic loss doctrine could bar all negligence claims against pro-
fessionals for purely economic losses. 20
II. THE MOORMAN DECISION AND ITS EARLY APPLICATION
Although Illinois courts first embraced the principle that recov-
ery of economic losses falls within the purview of contract law,21
the rule that economic losses generally are not recoverable in tort
was not clearly enunciated by the Illinois Supreme Court until its
decision in Moorman Manufacturing Co. v. National Tank Co. 2 2
In Moorman, the purchaser of a grain storage tank sued the seller
for the cost of repairing a crack in the tank and for loss of the use
of the tank.23 The plaintiff had argued that these damages were
15. Stein, Cottrell and Friedlander, A Blueprint for the Duties and Liabilities of De-
sign Professionals After Moorman, 60 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 163, 189 (1984).
16. Id.
17. See infra notes 21-36 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 50-75 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 76-99 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 100-22 and accompanying text.
21. In Alfred N. Koplin & Co. v. Chrysler Corp., 49 Ill. App. 3d 194, 364 N.E.2d
100 (2d Dist. 1977), the plaintiff suffered damages as a result of the breakdown of two air
conditioning units manufactured by the defendant. In dismissing a negligence count, the
court indicated that situations involving the "reasonably foreseeable commercial expecta-
tions of purchasers and sellers" are "the province of contract law." Id. at 203-04, 364
N.E.2d at 106-07. In Fireman's Fund Am. Ins. Cos. v. Burns Elec. Sec. Servs., 93 Ill.
App. 3d 298, 417 N.E.2d 131 (1st Dist. 1981), the Illinois Appellate Court for the First
District anticipated Moorman by affirming a trial court's dismissal of negligence and
strict liability counts seeking economic loss damages from the supplier of a burglary
alarm system. Id. at 301, 417 N.E.2d at 134. But see Bates & Rogers Constr. Corp. v.
North Shore Sanitary Dist., 92 Ill. App. 3d 90, 414 N.E.2d 1274 (2d Dist. 1980) (distin-
guishing Koplin and awarding economic losses in design defect case).
22. 91 111. 2d 69, 435 N.E.2d 443 (1982)
23. Id. at 72, 435 N.E.2d at 445.
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recoverable under the tort theories of strict liability, misrepresenta-
tion, and negligence.24 The appellate court reversed the trial
court's dismissal of the plaintiff's tort claims and allowed recovery
in tort for the plaintiff's economic dlosses.25
The Illinois Supreme Court reversed the appellate court's deci-
sion and held that damages for economic losses are recoverable in
tort actions only in three situations: when the plaintiff has sus-
tained additional damages in the form of personal injury or de-
struction of property because of a sudden or dangerous
occurrence, 26 when the plaintiff's damages are a proximate result
of a defendant's intentionally false representations, 27 or when the
plaintiff's damages are a proximate result of a negligent misrepre-
sentation by a defendant who is in the business of supplying infor-
mation for the guidance of others in their business transactions.28
The court defined economic losses as "damages for inadequate
value, costs of repair and replacement of the defective product, or
consequent loss of profits-without any claim of personal injury or
damage to other property";29 that is, economic losses seek recovery
for diminished value owing to inferior product quality.30 In his
concurring opinion in Moorman, Justice Simon brought this point
sharply into focus:
[i]f a product simply fails to live up to its promise, if it does not
accomplish what it was supposed to the way it was supposed to,
that is only an invasion of a contract-like interest: the user has
lost the benefit of his bargain.... The only risk is to commercial
expectations.,1
The holding in Moorman rests largely on the theory that tort law
affords a remedy only for losses arising from personal injuries or
damage to one's property; contract law and the Uniform Commer-
cial Code offer the appropriate remedy for economic losses occa-
sioned by diminished commercial expectations.32 In reaching this
24. Id.
25. Id. at 73, 435 N.E.2d at 444. The appellate court did not rule on the sufficiency
of the plaintiff's claim based upon breach of express warranty. Id.
26. Id. at 86, 435 N.E.2d at 450-51.
27. Id. at 88-89, 435 N.E.2d at 452.
28. Id. at 89, 435 N.E.2d at 452.
29. Id. at 82, 435 N.E.2d at 449 (quoting Note, Economic Loss in Products Liability
Jurisprudence, 66 COLUM. L. REv. 917, 918 (1966)).
30. Id. (quoting Comment, Manufacturers' Liability to Remote Purchasers for "Eco-
nomic Loss" Damages-Tort or Contract?, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 539, 541 (1966)). In con-
trast, non-economic damages may include personal injuries or damages to the property
itself as a result of the inferior quality. Id. at 82, 435 N.E.2d at 449.
31. Id. at 96, 435 N.E.2d at 455 (Simon, J., concurring).
32. Id. at 88-89, 435 N.E.2d at 452. The Moorman court opined that qualitative
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holding, the court drew upon a substantial line of authority provid-
ing that economic losses are not recoverable in strict liability ac-
tions because to permit such recovery would virtually eviscerate
the law of sales. 33 The Moorman court then applied the same ra-
tionale to prohibit recovery for economic loss actions based on neg-
ligence and innocent misrepresentation.34
According to the majority in Moorman, the "extension of the
tort theories of strict liability, negligence or innocent misrepresen-
tation to cover solely economic losses would, in effect, make a
manufacturer the guarantor that all of its products would continue
to perform satisfactorily throughout their reasonably productive
life. ' ' 35 Further, the court stated that to hold a manufacturer liable
for economic loss under these theories would contravene the legis-
lature's enactment of Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code
as the law governing transactions for the sale of goods.36 The court
expressed its desire to defer to the legislature in this area of com-
mercial law "'and accommodate when possible the evolution of
tort law with the principles laid down in the UCC.' ,37
In the same year that Moorman was decided, the Illinois
Supreme Court applied the reasoning in Moorman in a case involv-
ing a claim for negligence against a home builder. In Redarowicz v.
Ohlendorf,38 the plaintiff alleged that after he purchased a house
constructed by the defendant, the chimney and adjoining brick
wall began to pull away from the structure of the house. 39 The
cement wall cracked, resulting in water seepage.'
Addressing the plaintiff's negligence action, the court first noted
that the claim was not one in which the defective construction cre-
ated a hazard that resulted in physical injury.4 Rather, the plain-
tiff was seeking damages solely for the cost of repair and
defects are best handled by contract rather than tort law because tort law is "appropri-
ately suited for personal injury or property damage resulting from a sudden or dangerous
occurrence . . . [whereas] the remedy for a loss relating to a purchaser's disappointed
expectations due to deterioration, internal breakdown or non-accidental causes ... lies in
contract." Id. at 86, 435 N.E.2d at 450.
33. See id. at 76-77, 435 N.E.2d at 446, and cases cited therein.
34. See id. at 87-88, 435 N.E.2d at 451, and cases cited therein.
35. Id. at 91, 435 N.E.2d at 453.
36. Id. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 26, paras. 2-101 to 2-725 (1987).
37. Moorman, 91 111. 2d at 91, 435 N.E.2d at 453 (quoting Clark v. International
Harvester Co., 99 Idaho 326, 335, 581 P.2d 784, 793 (1978)).
38. 92 111. 2d 171, 441 N.E.2d 324 (1982).
39. Id. at 175, 441 N.E.2d at 326.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 178, 441 N.E.2d at 327.
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replacement of the defective chimney, the wall and the patio.4'
The court analogized these damages resulting from inferior work-
manship to those sufferea by the disgruntled tank owner in Moor-
man.4 3 The court stated that although the Redarowicz plaintiff's
commercial expectations were not met, "the only danger to the
plaintiff [was] that he would be forced to incur additional expenses
for living conditions that were less than what was bargained for." 44
The court then denied the plaintiff recovery for economic losses
under his negligence claim.45
In short, a buyer's desire to enjoy the benefit of his bargain is not
an interest traditionally protected under tort law." The
Redarowicz court elaborated upon this point by stating that
"'[t]raditionally, interests which have been deemed entitled to pro-
tection in negligence have been related to safety or freedom from
physical harm. Thus, where personal injury is threatened, a duty
in negligence has been readily found.' -47 Although property inter-
ests generally have been found to merit protection from physical
harm, " 'where mere deterioration or loss of the bargain is claimed,
the concern is with a failure to meet some standard of quality.
This standard of quality must be defined by reference to that which
the parties have agreed upon.' ",48 To recover in negligence, there-
fore, there must be a harm other than mere disappointed
expectations. 49
III. APPLICABILITY OF MOORMAN IN PROFESSIONAL
MALPRACTICE CASES
Since Moorman and Redarowicz, the Illinois Supreme Court has
expanded application of the Moorman doctrine beyond products
liability cases. For example, in Anderson Electric, Inc. v. Ledbet-
ter,50 the plaintiff entered into a contract as a subcontractor respon-
42. Id.
43. Id. at 176-77, 441 N.E.2d at 326-27.
44. Id at 178, 441 N.E.2d at 327.
45. Id
46. W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 92, at 613 (4th ed. 1971).
47. Redarowicz, 92 Ill. 2d at 177-78, 441 N.E.2d at 327 (quoting Crowder v.
Vandendeale, 564 S.W.2d 879, 882 (Mo. 1978) (emphasis in original)).
48. Id. (quoting Crowder, 564 N.E.2d at 882). At least one other state supreme court
has held that an action for breach of a service contract, resulting solely in economic loss,
is more appropriately suited for contract than tort. Oleyar v. Kerr, 217 Va. 88, 225
S.E.2d 398 (1976) (characterizing the plainitff's legal malpractice claim as a breach of
contract action for statute of limitations purposes).
49. Redarowicz, 92 Ill. 2d at 177, 441 N.E.2d at 327.
50. Anderson Elec., Inc. v. Ledbetter Erection Corp., 115 Ill. 2d 146, 503 N.E.2d 246
(1986).
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sible for performing electrical work on certain machinery and then
installing that machinery. Plaintiff alleged that although it per-
formed under the contract in a workmanlike manner, the defend-
ant improperly required that certain work be redone and failed to
supervise plaintiff's work as promised."'
The plaintiff sought damages in negligence and breach of con-
tract against the engineer for the additional costs incurred because
the defendant failed to perform according to the contract.5 2 Rely-
ing on Moorman, the court held that a plaintiff seeking to recover
purely economic losses due to defeated expectations of a commer-
cial bargain cannot recover in tort.53 Unlike the plaintiff in Moor-
man, the Anderson plaintiff's action involved a service contract. 54
The plaintiff, therefore, could not bring a claim under the U.C.C.
to recover its economic losses.5" The Anderson court noted this
disctinction, but it held that the plaintiff could not recover for its
economic losses in tort "regardless of [its] inability to recover
under an action in contract."5 6
After Anderson, the lower courts in Illinois applied the Moor-
man doctrine to a myriad of tort actions. The courts frequently
concluded, without extensive analysis or distinction, that an action
for economic losses resulting from breach of a duty or breach of a
service contract lies only in contract and not in tort.57 Courts disa-
gree, however, over whether the Moorman doctrine applies to pro-
fessional malpractice actions such as those involving architects or
engineers.5
In Rosos Litho Supply Corp. v. Hansen,59 the Illinois Appellate
Court for the First District stated that it did not read Moorman as
"having abolished by inference all professional malpractice actions
charging economic losses, arising from service contracts, based
51. Id. at 148-49, 503 N.E.2d at 246-47.
52. Id. at 147, 503 N.E.2d at 246.
53. Id. at 153, 503 N.E.2d at 249.
54. Id. at 152, 503 N.E.2d at 248-49.
55. Id. at 152, 503 N.E.2d at 249.
56. Id. The court noted that the plaintiff, in any event, was not without an available
remedy because it had an action pending against a third party for the same damages. Id.
at 153, 503 N.E.2d at 249.
57. See, e.g., Palatine Nat'l Bank v. Charles W. Greengard Assocs., Inc., 119 Inl.
App. 3d 376, 456 N.E.2d 635 (2d Dist. 1983).
58. Compare People ex rel. Skinner v. FGM, Inc., 166 I11. App. 3d 802, 520 N.E.2d
1024 (5th Dist. 1988); Rosos Litho Supply Corp. v. Hansen, 123 Il. App. 3d 290, 462
N.E.2d 566 (1st Dist. 1984) with Fence Rail Dev. Corp. v. Nelson & Assocs., Ltd., 174
I11. App. 3d 94, 528 N.E.2d 344 (2d Dist. 1988); People ex rel. Skinner v. Graham, 170
Ill. App. 3d 417, 524 N.E.2d 642 (4th Dist. 1988).
59. 123 Ill. App. 3d 290, 462 N.E.2d 566 (1st Dist. 1984).
1990]
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upon negligent violation of professional standards of care and
skill."' The court indicated that such a "significant departure
from established law" would affect malpractice claims against all
professional groups and, thus, "should be signalled expressly by
the supreme court itself. '61
The Appellate Court for the Fifth District also has declined to
apply the Moorman rule to professional negligence actions against
an architect and an engineer.62 In contrast, the Appellate Courts
for the Second, Third, and Fourth Districts have expressly held
that the Moorman rule applies to negligence and tort actions
against both architects and engineers.63 In People ex rel Skinner
v. Graham, the fourth district declined to embrace the reasoning in
Rosos, stating that when applying Moorman, "the relevant inquiry
[is] the type of loss sustained not the relationship giving rise to the
damage."' 64 The court then stated that "[w]e do not perceive [that]
Moorman has carved out an exception for professionals. ' 6 Under
the fourth district's approach, the applicability of the Moorman
doctrine depends solely on the nature of the damages sought, not
upon the particular defendant involved.
The Illinois Supreme Court finally addressed the issue of
whether there should be an exception to Moorman to permit a
plaintiff seeking to recover in tort for purely economic losses due to
professional negligence in 2314 Lincoln Park West Condominium
Association v. Mann, Ginn, Ebel & Frazier Ltd. 6 In 2314 Lincoln
Park West, a condominium association sought to recover for al-
leged defects in workmanship in the construction of a condomin-
ium building under both tort and contract theories.67 The
association sued the developer, contractor, roofer, manager, and
the architect, and the defendants moved to dismiss the plaintiff's
complaint. 6 The circuit court dismissed all counts except a negli-
gence claim against the building architect, ruling that recovery
under that count was not barred by Moorman.69
60. Id. at 297, 462 N.E.2d at 572.
61. Id.
62. See, e.g., FGM Inc., 166 Ill. App. 3d 802, 520 N.E.2d 1024.
63. See Fence Rail Dev. Corp., 174 Il1. App. 3d 94, 528 N.E.2d 344; Graham, 170 Il.
App. 3d 417, 524 N.E.2d 642; Ferentchak v. Village of Frankfort, 121 Ill. App. 3d 599,
459 N.E.2d 1285 (3d Dist. 1984).
64. Graham, 170 Ill. App. 3d at 435-36, 524 N.E.2d at 652.
65. Id. at 436, 524 N.E.2d at 652.
66. 136 Ill. 2d 302, 555 N.E.2d 346 (1990).
67. Id. at 304-06, 555 N.E.2d at 346-47.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 306, 555 N.E.2d at 347-48.
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The circuit court certified the question of whether there was an
exception to the rule in Moorman for tort actions against engineers
and architects seeking recovery for economic losses.70 The appel-
late court denied review of the circuit court's decision, but the Illi-
nois Supreme Court granted plaintiff's petition for review7' and
reversed the trial court, refusing to recognize an exception to
Moorman for professional malpractice claims against architects
and engineers.7 2 After reviewing the development of the Moorman
doctrine and its expansion to actions based on personal service
contracts, the court concluded that a plaintiff could not recover in
tort for economic losses resulting from an architect's professional
malpractice.7 a
The court distinguished cases allowing recovery in tort for mal-
practice claims against physicians and certain other professionals,
reasoning that in such cases "the defendant owe[d] a duty in tort to
prevent precisely the type of harm, economic or not, that oc-
curred. ' 74 The court then declined to impose upon architects a
duty to protect unit owners from loss due to frustrated expecta-
tions, stating that "[t]he architect's responsibility originated in its
contract with the original owner, and.., its duties should be mea-
sured accordingly. 7"
In declining to create an exception to the Moorman doctrine for
professional malpractice claims against architects, the court ex-
pressly refused to foretell the future of Moorman with respect to
other areas of professional malpractice.76 Thus, the extent to
which Moorman applies to actions based on professional service
contracts remains unclear.
IV. LEGAL MALPRACTICE ACTIONS
In addressing the applicability of Moorman to legal malpractice
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 317-18, 555 N.E.2d at 353.
73. Id. at 307-18, 555 N.E.2d at 348-53.
74. Id. at 315, 555 N.E.2d at 351-52 (citing, inter alia, Board of Educ. v. A.C.&S.,
Inc., 131 Ill. 2d 428, 439-51, 546 N.E.2d 580, 588 (1989) (allowing tort recovery for
damages to property incurred from installation of asbestos-containing material); Scott &
Fetzer Co. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 112 Ill. 2d 378, 387-88, 493 N.E.2d 1022, 1029
(1986) (allowing tort action where defects in an alarm system failed to detect a warehouse
fire); Vaughn v. General Motors Corp., 102 Ill. 2d 431, 436, 466 N.E.2d 195, 197 (1984)
(tort recovery allowed because defective brakes caused a truck to roll over and lose its
load)).
75. Id. at 317, 555 N.E.2d at 353.
76. Id. at 317-18, 555 N.E.2d at 353.
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claims, some commentators and state courts have stated that the
very essence of professional malpractice actions in general, and
legal malpractice actions in particular, is the relationship between
the parties and the nature of the services involved. Thus, although
the attorney-client relationship includes an element of the bar-
gained-for commercial expectations of the parties, inherent in the
relationship is the existence of an underlying agency relationship. 77
Whereas the agency relationship may have an implied or express
contract as its basis, any harm caused by misconduct of the agent
(the attorney) usually is remedied through an action based on neg-
ligence, grounded in traditional tort theories. 8
In Pelham v. Griesheimer,79 the Illinois Supreme Court unam-
biguously characterized a legal malpractice claim as an action
sounding in tort. In Pelham, the children of a deceased insured
sued the insured's attorney, arguing that the attorney failed to ex-
ercise a reasonable degree of professional care and skill when he
failed to see that the plaintiffs became the prime beneficiaries in
certain life insurance policies.8 0 The court held that under the
facts as pleaded, the attorney owed no duty of care to his client's
children and, therefore, the complaint failed to state a cause of
action."1
Significantly, the Pelham court found that plaintiff's claim for
legal malpractice was "couched in terms of negligence, not con-
tract."82 According to the court, a proper complaint sounding in
negligence must set forth facts that establish "the existence of a
duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiffs, a breach of that duty,
and an injury proximately resulting from the breach."83 Because
plaintiffs failed to allege that defendant owed them a duty, the
77. See People Express Airlines v. Consolidated Rail, 100 N.J. 246, 495 A.2d 107,112
(1985).
78. See, e.g., Christison, 83 Ill. App. 3d 334, 405 N.E.2d 8.
79. 92 Ill. 2d 13, 440 N.E.2d 96 (1982).
80. Id. at 16, 440 N.E.2d at 97.
81. Id. at 24, 440 N.E.2d at 101. The plaintiffs additionally argued that their com-
plaint stated a cause of action for breach of contract. They maintained that the com-
plaint should have been construed to allege that the children were third-party
beneficiaries of the contract between their mother and her attorney. Id. at 17, 440 N.E.2d
at 98. The defendant argued that the breach of contract claim was insufficiently pleaded
because the plaintiffs failed to allege that a contract was entered into for their direct
benefit. The court agreed with the defendant and stated that "the making of a contract
with an attorney for the benefit of a third party does not necessarily create an attorney-
client relationship between the attorney and the third-party beneficiary." Id. at 18, 440
N.E.2d at 98.
82. Id. at 18, 440 N.E.2d at 98.
83. Id.
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court dismissed the plaintiffs' complaint. 8 Consequently, the Pel-
ham court never addressed the question of whether economic
losses are recoverable in a tort-based legal malpractice action.
While Pelham characterized a legal malpractice action as one
sounding primarily in tort, other Illinois courts have indicated that
a breach of contract theory may also be used in a legal malpractice
claim. 5 For example, in Competitive Food Systems, Inc. v. Laser,8 6
the Illinois Appellate Court for the Second District allowed the
plaintiffs to use a breach of contract theory in their legal malprac-
tice claim and rejected the defendant's argument that, as a matter
of law, an attorney may only be sued for breach of duty in a legal
malpractice action. 7 The court reasoned that because the plain-
tiffs had adequately pleaded all the elements of a breach of contract
claim, they were not limited, as a matter of law, to suing only
under a legal malpractice theory; rather, the plaintiffs could sue the
defendants under a breach of contract theory. 88
Pelham and Competitive Food Systems indicate the substantial
amount of confusion among the Illinois courts in characterizing a
claim for legal malpractice. Although the more traditional ap-
proach characterizes legal malpractice as a tort, several courts
have recognized the viability in certain circumstances of a breach
of contract claim to remedy attorney malpractice. Because the
Moorman doctrine precludes economic recovery in tort in many
circumstances, alleging an alternative contract claim for damages
arising out of legal malpractice may be vital to the plaintiffs recov-
ery if the only damages alleged are for economic losses. Alterna-
tively, an exception to Moorman must be clearly stated to allow
recovery of economic damages in legal malpractice cases.
To date, only one Illinois court has directly addressed the appli-
cability of the Moorman doctrine to legal malpractice claims.8 9 In
84. Id. at 19, 440 N.E.2d at 100.
85. See, e.g., Collins v. Reynard, 195 Ill. App. 3d 1067, 553 N.E.2d 69 (4th Dist.
1990).
86. 170 Ill. App. 3d 606, 524 N.E.2d 207 (2d Dist. 1988).
87. Id. at 615-16, 524 N.E.2d at 212-13. The plaintiffs in Competitive Food Systems
alleged that they had entered into a separate agreement with the defendant more than one
year after initially retaining the defendants as legal counsel. Pursuant to this agreement,
the defendants were to perform all necessary legal work for preparing a stock offering
circular for the plaintiffs in exchange for a flat fee. Id.
88. Id.
89. In 2314 Lincoln Park West, 136 Ill. 2d at 318, 555 N.E.2d at 353, supreme court
dicta offered some insight into the applicability of the Moorman doctrine to legal mal-
practice actions. Id. The court stated that its application of Moorman to architectural
malpractice cases did not indicate the applicability of Moorman to all cases of profes-
sional malpractice, and in particular, to legal malpractice actions. Id. It distinguished
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Collins v. Reynard,9° the plaintiff sued an attorney and his law firm
for legal malpractice based upon breach of contract and negligence
theories. The defendant contended that Collins failed to state a
cause of action because she only alleged economic damages that
were not recoverable in tort. The circuit court denied the motion
to dismiss, but certified the question to the appellate court.91
On appeal, the Fourth District reversed the trial court on the
grounds that Moorman and its progeny precluded recovery of eco-
nomic losses in tort cases based on claims of negligence, including
cases alleging legal malpractice. 92 In so holding, the appellate
court specifically rejected the rationale of Rosos Litho Supply Corp.
v. Hansen.9 3 The Collins court interpreted the Moorman doctrine
as a broad mandate prohibiting economic recovery in all tort
claims based on negligence and, therefore, the court declined to
recognize an exception for professional malpractice claims.94
Although the Illinois Supreme Court has not yet addressed the
applicability of the Moorman doctrine to legal malpractice claims,
the court offered some insight to this question in 2314 Lincoln
Park West Condo. Assoc. v. Mann, Ginn, Ebel & Frazier, Ltd. 95 In
2314 Lincoln Park West, the court refused to recognize an excep-
tion to Moorman for professional malpractice actions against ar-
chitects. The court refused, however, to create a blanket extension
of the Moorman holding to all other professional malpractice
claims.96 In particular, the court distinguished actions for legal
malpractice as claims involving an "extracontractual duty not only
legal malpractice claims as actions in which economic recovery may be possible because
of an extracontractual duty existing between the attorney and the client. The court de-
clined to provide a more definitive statement on whether Moorman applies to legal mal-
practice claims because that issue was not before the court. Id
90. Collins, 195 Ill. App. 3d 1067, 553 N.E.2d 69.
91. Id. at 1068, 553 N.E.2d at 70.
92. Id. at 1072, 553 N.E.2d at 73.
93. Id. (citing Rosos, 123 Ill. App. 3d 290, 462 N.E.2d 566 (allowing recovery of
economic damages in architectural malpractice action)).
94. Id. at 1070-72, 553 N.E.2d at 71-73 (citing Moorman, 91 111. 2d 69, 435 N.E.2d
443; Anderson Elec., 115 Ill. 2d 1456, 503 N.E.2d 246 (barring recovery for economic
losses from contractor in tort); Morrow v. L.A. Goldschmidt Assoc., 112 Ill. 2d 87, 97-
98, 492 N.E.2d 181 (1986) (barring recovery against a builder); Scott & Fetzer Co., 112
Ill. 2d 378, 493 N.E.2d 1022 (disallowing recovery for economic losses from a seller in a
negligence action); Tolona Pizza Prods. Corp. v. Davy McKee Corp., 187 Ill. App. 3d
365, 370-71, 543 N.E.2d 225 (1st Dist. 1989) (engineer and architect malpractice); Wer-
blood v. Columbia College of Chicago, 180 Ill. App. 3d 967, 974, 536 N.E.2d 750 (1st
Dist. 1989) (action for negligenct administration brought against college trustees, presi-
dent and dean); Fence Rail Dev. Corp., 174 Ill. App. 3d 94, 528 N.E.2d 344 (architect).
95. 136 Ill. 2d 302, 555 N.E.2d 346 (1990).
96. Id. at 317, 555 N.E.2d at 353.
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to the client but also to the group of persons the client intended
benefit."'97
By recognizing an extracontractual duty between the attorney
and his client, the court implied that an attorney's obligation to his
client is not based solely on the contract existing between them.98
Rather, the nature of the laywer's undertaking and the lawyer's
"traditional responsibilities" create a duty to render legal services
with due care. 99 The court indicated that the appropriate means
for redressing a breach of this extracontractual duty would be an
action in tort. 100
V. POLICY CONCERNS
Moorman and its progeny leave numerous and substantial un-
resolved questions regarding the application of the economic loss
doctrine in Illinois.01 While some courts have held that Moorman
did not intend a wholesale revision and automatic shift of profes-
sional and legal malpractice actions from tort to contract law,
other courts have reached the opposite conclusion. 02 To resolve
these conflicting interpretations of Moorman, the courts must de-
velop a remedial scheme that remains consistent with the Moor-
man doctrine and yet considers the interests of the parties. 03 The
end result may very well be a substantial change in the way the
Illinois courts look at "contractually-originated liability involving
products, realty and services."' 4
Clearly, the Moorman decision is not limited solely to cases in-
volving product liability or the Uniform Commercial Code.' 5 As
one commentator suggested, "[t]he Moorman opinion is a philo-
sophical exposition of the bases of contract and tort law and there
is nothing in its theoretical analysis which would limit application
97. Id. at 318, 555 N.E.2d at 353.
98. Id. at 317-18, 555 N.E.2d at 353. In contrast, the court stated that an architect's
duty to his clients stemmed entirely from the contract for the architect's services. Ac-
cordingly, the court declined to impose on an architect a duty to protect clients from
losses stemming from defects in building quality. Id. at 317, 555 N.E.2d at 353.
99. Id. at 318, 555 N.E.2d at 353.
100. Id. at 317-18, 555 N.E.2d at 353.
101. Bertschy, The Economic Loss Doctrine in Illinois After Moorman, 71 ILL. B.J.
346, 355 (1983).
102. See Rosos, 123 Ill. App. 3d 290 462 N.E.2d 566; FGM Inc., 166 I11. App. 3d 802,
520 N.E.2d 1024; Graham, 170 Ill. App. 3d 417, 524 N.E.2d 642; People Express Airlines,
100 N.J. at 255-57, 495 A.2d at 112.
103. Stein, Cottrell and Friedlander, supra note 15, at 168.
104. Bertschy, supra note 101, at 355.
105. Id. at 354.
1990]
Loyola University Law Journal
of the theory to [product liability] cases."''0 6 Both Moorman and
Redarowicz used the term "economic loss" as a "shorthand" way
of indicating injuries suffered as a result of disappointed commer-
cial expectations, or the failure to obtain the full benefit of a bar-
gain. 107 Given this broad definition of "economic loss," it would be
impossible to limit Moorman to the product liability context.
In an effort to limit application of Moorman, other commenta-
tors assert that the definition of economic loss used in Moorman
suggests a loss in something that is negotiated.108 These commen-
tators assert that in an attorney-client relationship, unlike most
contractual relationships, services are not bargained for, results are
not warranted or promised and, although the client agrees to pay
fees, the attorney agrees to do more than be employed. 109 A special
relationship exists between the attorney and the client which im-
poses upon the attorney the duty to protect the client from being
deprived of economic expectations through the attorney's
negligence.
The decision in People Express Airlines v. Consolidated Rail
Corp. 110 provides a summary of yet another approach toward per-
mitting recovery for economic losses in tort-based professional
malpractice actions. In People Express Airlines, the New Jersey
Supreme Court discussed, in great detail, the problems underscor-
ing a pure per se bar of recovery for negligently caused economic
losses, Ill the analysis for avoidance of this rule," 2 and specific ex-
ceptions that have developed to this rule."1 3 One such exception is
the "special relationship" exception.114 This exception applies if a
106. Id.
107. Stein, Cottrell and Friedlander, supra note 15, at 171.
108. See generally Rosos, 123 Ill. App. 3d 290, 462 N.E.2d 566. Rosos states that
there is, and should be, a recognized difference between economic loss resulting from
failed commercial deals and those resulting from professional negligence. Id. at 293-98,
462 N.E.2d at 570-73.
109. See generally People Express Airlines, 100 N.J. 246, 255-57, 495 A.2d 107, 112
(1985).
110. Id.
111. Id. at 252-53, 495 A.2d at 110.
112. Id. at 255-63, 495 A.2d at 112-16.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 256-58, 495 A.2d at 112-13. This exception encompasses auditors, survey-
ors, termite inspectors, engineers, attorneys, notary publics, architects, weighers and tele-
graph companies. See H. Rosenblum Inc. v. Adler, 93 N.J. 324, 461 A.2d 138 (1983)
(auditor negligently prepared public financial statement; auditor held liable to plaintiff
who purchased worthless stock); Rozny v. Marnul, 43 I1l. 2d 54, 250 N.E.2d 656 (1969)
(surveyor's negligence resulted in incorrect depiction of boundary of lot; surveyor held
liable to remote purchaser); Hardy v. Carmichael, 207 Cal. App. 2d 218, 24 Cal. Rptr.
475 (Cal. Ct. App. 1962) (termite inspector liable to purchaser of infested home); M.
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defendant is professional who breaches a specific duty to avoid eco-
nomic injury to a foreseeable plaintiff. In a legal malpractice
claim, the client is a particularly foreseeable plaintiff.'15 Addition-
ally, an attorney, who because of his negligence, causes economic
or purely pecuniary damage to his client, recognizes and should
fully comprehend that such breach of duty and subsequent dam-
ages are the natural and probable consequence of his negligence.
Consequently, the special relationship exception applies to the at-
torney-client relationship and allows recovery for economic loss in
a legal malpractice action.
The "special relationship" exception recognized in other juris-
dictions effectively precludes the application of the economic loss
doctrine to professional malpractice actions. While the Illinois
courts have declined to adopt a similar exception, some courts
have limited the application of Moorman through the recognition
of an extracontractual duty.11 6  This extracontractual duty arises
in professional relationships because persons generally repose a
great degree of trust and confidence in professionals. 1 7 Moreover,
a client's reliance on a professional places the client at great risk of
injury from substandard performance.'18 Given the great trust
placed in professionals, a duty to the client exists apart from the
Miller Co. v. Central Contra Costa Sanitary Dist., 198 Cal. App. 2d 305, 18 Cal. Rptr. 13
(Cal. Ct. App. 1961) (engineer liable for negligence resulting in contractor's losses); Lu-
cas v. Hamm, 56 Cal. 2d 583, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821, 364 P.2d 685 (Cal. Ct. App. 1961), cert.
denied, 368 U.S. 987 (1962) (attorney negligently caused intended beneficiary of will to be
deprived of will proceeds); Immerman v. Ostertag, 83 N.J. Super. 364, 199 A.2d 869
(N.J. Super. 1964) (notary public held liable for negligence resulting in out-of-privity
mortgagee's economic loss); Biakanja v. Irving, 49 Cal. 2d 647, 320 P.2d 16 (1958) (no-
tary public's negligence caused intended beneficiary of will to be deprived of expected
proceeds; notary held liable); United States v. Rogers & Rogers, 161 F. Supp. 132 (S.D.
Cal. 1958) (architects' negligence resulted in use of defective concrete; architect held lia-
ble to contractor); Glanzer v. Shepard, 233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275 (1922) (public
weigher held liable for negligent acts causing remote buyer's losses); Western Union Tel.
Co. v. Mathis, 215 Ala. 282, 110 So. 399 (1926) (telegraph company's negligent transmis-
sion resulted in plaintiff's loss); see also W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 107, at 705
(4th ed. 1971); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (1977). Cf Strauss v. Belle
Realty Co., 65 N.Y.2d 399, 492 N.Y.S.2d 167, 482 N.E.2d 34 (1985); Newlin v. New
England Tel. & Tel. Co., 316 Mass. 234, 54 N.E.2d 929 (1944) (plaintiffs recovered eco-
nomic losses either in negligence or as third party beneficiaries of contract for electricity
due to utility blackout; in each cse, plaintiffs had suffered some physical harm as well).
115. People Express Airlines, 100 N.J. at 267, 495 A.2d at 118.
116. See, e.g., 2314 Lincoln Park West, 136 Ill. 2d 302, 555 N.E.2d 346 (1990) (dicta
recognizing an extracontractual duty in an attorney-client relationship); Harrison, 715 F.
Supp. 1425 (recognizing an extracontractual duty in a broker-client relationship).
117. Bertschy, supra note 101, at 354.
118. Id.
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contractual arrangement between the two.119 Imposing this duty
upon certain professionals would emphasize their affirmative obli-
gation to protect their clients from economic injury. Breach of this
duty would be remedied in tort, and the plaintiff would be allowed
to recover economic damages. 120
Although the extracontractual duty approach would allow
courts to award recovery for economic losses in professional mal-
practice claims, the courts have been reluctant to adopt this theory.
To date, an extracontractual duty has only been recognized be-
tween a brokerage firm and its client.' 2' The Illinois supreme court
indicated in dicta that the attorney-client relationship involves an
extracontractual duty, but perhaps signalling its willingness to con-
sider such an approach, the court has not yet definitively resolved
this issue. 122
VI. CONCLUSION
The application of the Moorman doctrine to professional mal-
practice actions in general, and legal malpractice actions in partic-
ular, remains an unsettled question in Illinois. Because most
professional malpractice claims sound in tort and Moorman pre-
cludes recovery for economic losses in tort, some alternative rem-
edy must be developed to compensate clients harmed by
professional malpractice and, simultaneously, to deter professional
negligence. Perhaps it is through the recognition of an extracon-
tractual duty that the courts most appropriately can allow recovery
for economic losses in certain professional malpractice claims. The
precise basis and scope of this extracontractual duty, however,
must be clearly defined to prevent the complete erosion of the
Moorman doctrine.
119. See supra note 116 (citing 2314 Lincoln Park West and Harrison).
120. See, e.g., Harrison, 715 F. Supp. 1425 (economic loss can be recovered in mal-
practice action against brokerage firm).
121. Id.
122. Additionally, the adoption of this extracontractual duty approach stands in di-
rect opposition to those Illinois decisions that find contract law more appropriately suited
for professional malpractice claims. See, e.g., Collins, 195 Ill. App. 3d 1067, 553 N.E.2d
69.
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